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Abstract. Safety cases have been produced and researched for decades.
Definitions of ‘safety case’ agree on both the need to generate suitable
evidence and the central role of argument. But the relevant literature
seems to exhibit multiple schools of thought that are largely unrecognized
and somewhat at odds with each other. This paper presents preliminary
results from research to identify and characterize the safety case schools
of thought so as to reduce confusion and discord in research and practice.
1 Introduction
Safety cases—the safety-specific form of assurance cases—have been produced,
reviewed, researched, and written about for decades [42]. Definitions of safety
case agree on the need for suitable evidence and, recently, the central role of
argument. But the literature exhibits multiple schools of thought on safety cases
and their value. We hypothesize that (1) several distinct but largely unidentified
schools of thought exist and (2) no one form of safety case suits them equally well.
If so, identifying and distinguishing the schools of thought will help stakeholders
better understand, interpret, and contribute to the relevant literature.
Shared understanding of safety cases is challenged by stakeholders’ diversity
of domains and technical specialities. Without such an understanding, specialists
in a particular field may make recommendations that seem to them well-justified
yet are nevertheless detrimental. A newcomer might hear about other regulators’
success with safety cases, read about a subtly different thing also called a safety
case, and fall prey to an equivocation fallacy.
Differences between the schools of thought might explain differences among
recommendations for practitioners. For example, researchers have argued in favor
of graphical argument notations, structured prose, and symbolic logic [29,34,47].
These mutually exclusive endorsements might reflect different interpretations of
limited evidence for each notation’s efficacy. But they might also reflect different
understandings of the purpose and scope of safety cases.
In this paper, we report on a literature survey in progress. To date, we have
identified nine schools of thought and six inconsistencies in what they ask of
arguments. We have not identified the complete range of thought or perfectly
captured any part of it, and we are not the first to note apparent differences in
the use of the term safety case [36]. But safety case research is ongoing, safety
case practice is expanding—e.g., as ISO 26262 [31] is adopted—and the schools
of thought remain apparently unrecognized. We hope that these early results
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180000378 2019-08-30T13:22:47+00:00Z
2 Patrick John Graydon
will both (a) promote clarity in ongoing research and practice and (b) prompt
conversation that will help to identify and characterize the schools of thought.
2 Asking Better Questions
Typical definitions of ‘safety case’ focus on form and emphasize either the case’s
collective nature or an explicit argument. For example, the UN Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) defines a waste repository safety case as “a formal compilation
of evidence, analyses and arguments that quantify and substantiate a claim that
the repository will be safe” [40]. The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) standard
defines an assurance case as an “argument, supported by a body of evidence,
that a system, service or organisation will operate as intended for a defined
application in a defined environment” [3]. Though useful, these definitions do
not suggest testable efficacy hypotheses or the relative merits of, e.g., argument
notations. To clarify efficacy hypotheses found in the literature, we asked:
1. What value does a safety argument deliver?
2. To whom does a safety argument deliver each kind of value?
3. How does a safety argument produce that value?
4. How well does a safety argument produce each kind of value?
Evidence answering the last question would underpin decisions about safety
case practice. Such evidence is badly needed: one might deploy an untested
tool or technique in a low-consequence application with little justification, but
increasing consequences demand correspondingly stronger evidence of efficacy.
3 Schools of Thought
In 2016, Rinehart et al. conducted interviews and a literature survey to assess
what it means for assurance cases to ‘work’ [42]. While insightful, that work
did not fully address the questions presented in Sect. 2. We are reassessing both
the assurance-case-related works they surveyed—and works published since—to
better characterize the safety case schools of thought. This section presents, in
arbitrary order, nine schools of thought we have identified to date.
The schools of thought are not mutually exclusive: while each identifies a
distinguishable stream of thought, single sources often exhibit several at once.
Moreover, the literature survey is not systematic. It need not be: our aim is
not to assess either the balance of evidence for and against a proposition or the
prevalence of any school of thought. We aim instead to identify and characterize
as many schools of thought as practicable. While our literature survey remains
incomplete presenting these preliminary findings will help us to identify more
schools of thought and refine our current descriptions.
3.1 A Safety Case (Report) Is (the Product of) a Risk Assessment
This school of thought defines a safety case as a (residual) risk assessment, possi-
bly summarized in a safety case report. An explicit, overarching safety argument
is either omitted or less central than risk assessment and management.
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Kind of argument. Safety case documentation might include explicit argument,
e.g., to justify predictions about the efficacy of a safety management system or
new mitigations. Such arguments are likely to be informal and loosely structured.
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. First, by generating insight into appli-
cation-specific risks, “doing a safety case” is said to yield more effective risk
mitigation than, e.g., implementing prescribed safety features. Second, safety
cases are said to better inform decision-makers by communicating risk assess-
ments more effectively than, e.g., unstructured collections of safety artifacts.
Examples. This school of thought is often exemplified by discussions of safety
case development as an approach to safety assurance. For example, one textbook
notes that “developing a safety case through analysis of [residual] risk is one way
of finding out details about the level of risk that people or things are being ex-
posed to” and introduces HAZOP, fault trees, event trees, ZHA, FMEA, etc. as
“techniques and tools for safety cases” [37]. One inquiry meant to “examine the
arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation” of an aircraft
famously labeled that aircraft’s safety case “a lamentable job” owing mainly to
shortcomings in its risk assessment [23]. A paper about nuclear waste reposito-
ries notes that “in recent years, the scope of the safety assessment has broadened
to include the collation of a broad range of evidence and arguments that com-
plement and support the reliability of the results of quantitative analyses and
the broader term ‘safety case’ is used to refer to these extended studies” [5].
3.2 A Safety Case Documents the Story of a System’s Safety
In this school of thought, a safety argument or narrative tells diverse stakeholders
what it means for a system or service to be safe and how it achieves safety.
Kind of argument. The bulk of the argument traces the most significant hazards
to safety requirements and assessment results. A writer might argue over spe-
cific software contributions to hazards—rather than about such contributions
as a class—thereby communicating the writer’s contention that the specified
contributions are what matter in the application at hand.
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. By clearly communicating the safety
story, the safety argument facilitates the work of each stakeholder. For example,
a developer who is aware of the safety story might be less likely to inadvertently
undermine safety than one who is not. An assessor who is aware of the story
might be better able to judge the appropriateness of a particular type of evidence.
It is the accessibility, clarity, conciseness, and detail level of the tale—properties
that might be at odds in some cases—that determine the argument’s value.
Examples. This school of thought often appears in discussion about how safety
cases benefit a large and diverse readership. For example, Alexander et al. write
that “whenever we honestly claim that a system is acceptably safe or secure, . . .
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we have some mental model behind that claim that we could probably describe
if asked. By making an explicit assurance case, however, we open up that mental
model to review and criticism by others, and we record our reasoning so that
others can learn from it (for example, if they want to make a change to the
system they can use the assurance case to assess some of the impact)” [2]. The
GSN Community Standard notes that the key benefit of explicitly documenting
a safety argument is that doing so “can improve comprehension amongst the
key stakeholders (e.g., system developers, engineers, independent assessors and
certification authorities)” [3]. This in turn “improves the quality of the debate
and the time taken to reach agreement on the [safety] approaches being adopted.”
An NEA report notes that safety arguments for waste repositories are meant to
describe, among other things, the safety management strategy, siting and design
strategy, safety assessment strategy, system concept, and repository design to be
used [40].
3.3 A Software Safety Argument Shows Requirements Refinement
Adherents to this school of thought maintain that a safety argument shows how
safety requirements are correctly refined through tiers of design detail level. In
doing so, the argument replaces alternatives such as traceability matrices.
Kind of argument. This school of thought is often applied to software safety
arguments that show how each system safety requirement allocated to software is
refined by high-level software requirements, low-level software requirements, and
the source code (which is itself a form of specification) [47]. The argument cites
software-level testing, integration testing, unit testing, and other verification and
validation evidence at appropriate levels.
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. First, an argument tracing requirements
down to evidence might benefit (a) engineers planning verification and valida-
tion and (b) assessors reviewing those plans by more clearly communicating the
relevance of each evidence item than alternatives such as RTCA DO-178C confor-
mance documentation [45]. Second, an argument tracing requirements through
levels of design detail might better communicate to programmers each module’s
contribution to system safety than alternatives such as traceability matrices.
Third, such an argument might facilitate better detection of requirements de-
composition errors than reviews and analyses using only alternatives such as
traceability matrices. Some researchers suggest machine analysis of arguments
for this purpose, but such approaches remain without justification [15].
Examples. This school of thought is often evident in software safety argu-
ment patterns. For example, the Software Contribution Safety Argument Pat-
tern proposed by Hawkins and Kelly explicitly traces software safety require-
ments through tiers of design decomposition [25]. Proposed patterns for the
safety arguments that ISO 26262 requires for electrical or electronic systems in
road vehicles trace safety goals to functional safety concepts, technical safety
concepts, and hardware and software safety requirements [7,31].
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3.4 A Safety Case Establishes Confidence in Safety Claims
In this school of thought, safety cases justify an assessable degree of confidence in
claims about safety or its contributing factors. The degree of confidence depends
on several factors, including the nature and quality of evidence cited [35].
Kind of argument. Various kinds of argument have been proposed to facilitate
assessment of argument confidence [19]. For example, a confidence argument
might present known argument defeaters and their resolution, if any, to facilitate
qualitative judgments of argument sufficiency [13,27]. Other researchers propose
breaking arguments down into specific forms of reasoning steps—e.g., comple-
mentary or sufficient condition list arguments—to facilitate using formulae to
compute confidence in claims from judgments of evidence strength [10,19].
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. First, regulators might use confidence
assessment results as the basis for a decision to certificate an aircraft type or
compel a recall or remediation. Second, the review and analysis needed to assess
confidence might show developers where it is being lost, thus helping to more
effectively target resources spent on improving the overall safety assessment.
Examples. This school of thought is evident in proposals to evaluate argument
confidence. For example, Ayoub, Go´rski, and others propose using Dempster–
Shafer Theory to evaluate the confidence an argument should inspire [4,19,50].
Others have proposed using Bayesian Belief Networks for this purpose [19].
Hawkins et al. propose identifying potential argument defeaters in a confidence
argument to facilitate holistic confidence judgments [27]. Goodenough et al. pro-
pose documenting these defeaters in a confidence map and counting them as a
measure of confidence [13,16]. It also appears in a more general form in the
proposition that the function of an argument is to inspire confidence in a reader.
For example, security arguments have been said to “convince a reader that a
system can satisfy the security requirements laid upon it” [24].
Note. It is sometimes posited that preparing a safety case readies developers
to argue in a law court, after a mishap, to have met their safety-related legal
obligations [36]. While the claim in question and the target audience are different,
this claimed value also turns on safety cases establishing confidence.
3.5 A Safety Case Promotes and Focuses Safety Thinking
In this school of thought, creating a safety case forces developers to think about
the context-specific meaning of safety and how to achieve and demonstrate it.
Kind of argument. The scope and depth of the safety argument is critical to this
school of thought: a writer that does not address a topic or issue in detail will
not have been forced by the writing process to think deeply about that topic or
issue and thus will not derive the related benefit.
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Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. The core claim of this school of thought
is that the act of writing a safety argument forces developers to ponder critical
questions [49]. Doing so produces more insight into (a) hazards, (b) the way
they are mitigated or managed, and (c) the means of verifying and validating
the system implementation than following a prescribed process would have.
Examples. The value derived from critical reflection is often cited as a reason
to adopt an assurance case process. For example, a healthcare industry report
proposing the adoption of safety cases in that industry observes that “safety cases
were explicitly introduced in a number of domains to encourage systematic and
holistic thinking about safety issues” [9]. Others have asserted that safety cases
are “a vehicle to stimulate critical thinking” [46]. In its most extreme form, this
school of thought manifests in the claim that safety arguments can be used to
perform what is effectively a form of hazard analysis or causal analysis. For ex-
ample, Eagles and Wu assert that argumentation is a “tool that can facilitate
both top-down and bottom-up analyses,” including “identification of hazardous
situations, causes, or subcauses, including low-level causes” [12]. Kang and Jack-
son “describe a technique for analyzing a dependability argument—the argument
that a trusted base is alone sufficient to establish a requirement; that is, it is not
missing a component that is also necessary for the requirement to hold” [32].
3.6 A Safety Argument Explains and Integrates Safety Evidence
In this vision, a safety argument explains and integrates its safety evidence [34].
Kind of argument. In this school of thought, safety arguments link evidence types
to claim types. Safety arguments might argue over requirements individually or
as part of categories such as ‘software functional requirements’ (as in arguments
representing standards [30]). Evidence might be as specific as named test cases
or as general as ‘black-box software functional testing.’ The argument might
include details relevant to assessing the evidence’s strength or validity [27].
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. The argument illustrates how the cited
evidence collectively covers a proposition to be shown [17,42]. First, develop-
ers arguing this is thought to help developers create more efficient or effec-
tive development plans than had they simply describes those plans as, e.g., as
a plan for software aspects of certification (PSAC) [45]. Second, assessors are
thought to better judge the sufficiency of evidence or identify gaps or potential
improvements than had they been presented with an alternate form of documen-
tation. Third, this might help reviewers analyzing a standard to identify gaps
and flaws in its assurance requirements [20]. Fourth, these arguments might help
researchers to identify hypotheses about the efficacy of selected techniques.
Examples. This school of thought is often evident in papers about certification.
As one report observes, “all evidence provides only partial support for a given
high-level claim” [2]. As a Health Foundation report observes,
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a diversity of evidence sources and types are required to demonstrate
system safety – such as trials, human factors analysis, testing and oper-
ational experience. However, this diversity and amount of evidence can
create difficulties. It can be difficult to judge completeness. Is the ev-
idence set comprehensive? Does it cover all the issues? It can also be
difficult to understand the distinct role and purpose served by each form
of evidence. Safety cases help in this regard, by presenting the argu-
ment that explains how the overall safety objectives can be seen to be
addressed through the assembled items of evidence [9].
Ruiz et al., paraphrasing Eagles and Wu, observe that medical safety cases “en-
sur[e] the completeness of risk identification and risk controls” [12,46]. Similar
observations have been made for security arguments [39]. For example, Tippen-
hauer et al. describe security arguments as “mak[ing] explicit the underlying
interdependecies of different pieces of security-related information” [48].
3.7 A Safety Argument Focuses Systematic Regulatory Inquiry
This school of thought is concerned with how regulators assess systems and make
decisions such as whether to certify a system or require redress of an issue.
Kind of argument. This school of thought is not limited to any form of argument.
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. Regulators systematically assess a sub-
mitted argument, investigating other artifacts more deeply as needed and in light
of their purpose as expressed in the argument [33,35]. Such inquiries are thought
to reveal more issues in an inspector’s limited time than alternatives such as
audits focused on issues implicated by recent or notable incidents or accidents.
Examples. This school of thought is evident in descriptions of how safety cases
are used in regulation. For example, Eagles and Wu write that “the structured
documentation provided by a safety assurance case can help an independent
reviewer evaluate the rationale and evidence for safety efficiently and effectively,
without requiring the same level of familiarity with the device as a member of
the development team” [12]. This school of thought is also evident in proposed
techniques for reviewing of safety arguments [21,33].
3.8 A Safety Argument Facilitates Choosing Among Potential
Mitigations and Lifecycle Activities
In this school of thought, developers use safety arguments as whiteboards to pro-
pose and assess designs and plans for development, verification, and validation.
Kind of argument. This school of thought requires the safety argument (1) to
cover the hazards to be mitigated; (2) to give the goals to be met by lifecycle
activities; and (3) to be updated after each development decision is made. Some
techniques might require the use of specialized (e.g., formal) argument notations.
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Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. By creating and assessing variants to
explore potential decisions, developers gain insight into the application-specific
effect those decisions might have. This might “allow targeting of resources and
efforts, thus avoiding spending wildly varying and disproportionate amounts of
effort on risk management” (in comparison with using standard best practices
regardless of circumstance) [9].
Examples. This school of thought is evident in exhortations to “integrat[e] the
safety case into the design and development process” and “design for assess-
ment” [8]. As one tool developer put it, “a safety case can . . . act as a focal
point for project management since material in the safety case provides a lot of
material upon which management decisions are made” [1]. The same developer
also observed that “development of arguments for the safety cases of complex
systems frequently requires extensive and protracted manipulation of arguments
to facilitate the exploration of alternative lines of argumentation.” The NEA
report quoted earlier observes that safety cases are often
compiled and presented at certain stages of a stepwise repository develop-
ment programme with an aim to inform decision makers about whether
adequate information is available to that decisions to proceed to the next
step can be made. . . . As a repository development programme contin-
ues to advance, the safety case provides an important basis for repository
development activities including research and development (R&D) [40].
This school of thought finds its purest expression in detailed proposals for safety-
argument-centric development methodologies such as Assurance Based Develop-
ment and Despotou’s systems-of-systems assurance framework [11,14,35].
3.9 A Safety Argument Guides Accident Investigation
This school of thought holds that, where available, safety arguments should guide
accident and incident investigation and response.
Kind of argument. The argument must cover each mitigation for each hazard
(rather than argue over them as a class in the manner of a process argument).
Values, beneficiaries, and mechanisms. A safety argument presents claims about
the safety-related behaviors and features of a system or service. If the conclusion
of adequate safety is false, one or more of those claims, or the logic connecting
them, must be in error. By systematically testing the argument’s claims, an
investigator might gain insight into the causes of an accident more effectively or
efficiently than by using other accident investigation methods.
Examples. The Pandora approach to analyzing digital system failures uses the
safety argument (1) to suggest hypotheses about causal factors to be investigated
and (2) to assess proposed mitigations [22]. Security researchers have suggested
similar uses for security arguments [44].
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3.10 Related Schools of Thought: Safety Argument Analogues
There are schools of thought surrounding arguments that are analogous to as-
surance arguments focused on safety or security. We identify two here.
Modeling Standards. An analyst might model the argument implicit in a
safety or security standard [20,30]. The purposes for doing so might include:
– To be critically analyzed in order to assess the standard, answering questions
such as, Should the standard call for additional evidence?
– To facilitate decisions about evidence substitutions, e.g., whether to accept
alternative methods of compliance with DO-178C [45].
– Pedagogical purposes, i.e., teaching the core logic of the standard that must
be appreciated if readers are to correctly interpret its requirements.
Analyzing or Teaching Safety Tools, and Techniques. Analysts might
model the arguments surrounding tools and techniques [17]. The analysis might
promote thinking about the tool’s role in achieving or demonstrating safety, thus
helping the analyst to identify critical factors that determine how well the tool
or technique supports a given kind of assurance claim. Such factors comprise
potential defeaters for safety arguments that rely on those tools, techniques,
or mitigations [13,16,27,43]. The resulting argument might be used to teach
developers about those defeaters.
4 Some Tension Between the Schools of Thought
In Sect. 3, we identified nine distinct but overlapping schools of thought. Having
multiple schools of thought can be problematic if they are unrecognized and
no single form of safety case suits all schools equally well. In this section, we
describe six issues of contention for safety case practice and, for each, identify
schools of thought that would favor different resolutions to the issue.
This list of tensions is incomplete. Moreover, the existence of tensions need
not preclude the joint application of schools of thought to a safety case provided
stakeholders are aware of the tension and appropriate tradeoffs are made.
4.1 The Scope and Completeness of Safety Arguments
The complete safety case for a system or service must address each hazard and
safety requirement. But an argument could explicitly represent all, none, or some
of these (in the latter two cases using categorical arguments and detail relegated
to linked documents). These options vary in desirability according to school of
thought. If the argument is meant to show requirements refinement (Sect. 3.3), it
must trace all requirements through all design levels. But if such detail obscures
the story of a system’s safety (Sect. 3.2), argument writers might focus on key
requirements, relegating complete details to linked documents.
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A complete safety case must also discuss both process of producing artifacts
and evidence and safety-relevant features of the product produced. The balance
of attention the explicit argument pays to each of these might vary. Arguments
focused on process adequacy might better demonstrate confidence (Sect. 3.4)
and facilitate regulatory inquiry (Sect. 3.7) than arguments that illustrate the
decomposition of all requirements. Human reviewers do not have unlimited time;
the more their attention is directed to important matters, the more productive
their auditing can be expected to be. But if confidence is computed, it might be
necessary for the argument to cover all hazards and safety requirements.
4.2 The Depth of Safety Arguments
Top-down argument creation methods raise a question: when should arguers
stop decomposing claims? There is no universal test for whether a claim is basic
enough to be supported directly by evidence. Indeed, while most professionals
will agree on whether a given thing is evidence in a given case, neither the safety
argumentation literature nor the literature on its philosophical foundations offers
a useful, concrete definition of ‘evidence’ [18]. This raises many questions of the
basic form Should we argue over or through X? For instance, consider a claim
that software will cause a computer system to exhibit a desired behavior. A
writer might support this claim by appealing to a corresponding software safety
requirement, an appropriate integrity level assignment, and software conformity
review results. But a writer might instead argue through software design levels,
documenting requirements traceability and the role of integration testing along
the way. If an argument is to show requirements refinement (Sect. 3.3), the writer
must take the deeper course. But arguments that focus on a few key requirements
might better document the story of safety (Sect. 3.2). Moreover, if adequate
evidence of requirements refinement has already been provided, auditors’ time
might be better used by an argument that invites them to question the proposed
mitigations and integrity level allocations (Sect. 3.7).
4.3 Safety Argument Syntax and Structure
Definitions of argument notations describe basic syntactic limits. For example,
GSN permits goals to support other goals either directly or through a strategy
element [3]. Some argument construction methods place few further restrictions
on such argument steps [3]. Some techniques are more restrictive. For example,
one confidence quantification proposal requires arguments to be constructed of
argument steps that each can be classified as a complementary argument, alter-
native argument, sufficient condition list argument, etc. [10]. One might argue
that a “system is acceptably safe to operate” because of n premises of the form
“hazard i mitigated” [27]. Or one might first argue that “all significant hazards
have been identified” and “identified hazards have been acceptably mitigated,”
only then supporting the latter claim with the same premises. One could, in
principle, expand any complex argument step into an equivalent combination
of more basic steps. Doing so might facilitate confidence assessment (Sect. 3.4),
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either by satisfying the structural requirements of a quantification technique or
by making the argument step easier for human reviewers to critically analyze.
But doing so would likely enlarge the argument structure, which might make it
harder for readers to grasp the big picture of the safety story (Sect. 3.2).
4.4 The Use of Argument Patterns
Safety argument patterns have long been proposed as a means of reusing suc-
cessful fragments of argument [34]. But their use might have effects beyond
the ease of writing. For example, a pattern might function as a kind of fram-
ing device, helping readers to grasp the big picture quickly. If so, arguments
comprising patterns might better document the story of a system’s safety than
entirely bespoke arguments (Sect. 3.2) [34]. A conscientious writer might thor-
oughly examine whether a pattern reflects the system or service in question
without oversimplifying or omitting relevant detail. But if writers use patterns
less conscientiously, the argument writing process might fail to promote safety
thinking (Sect. 3.5). Worse, it is possible that a pattern would be instantiated by
a writer who does not fully understand it, thus giving the reader the impression
of greater understanding than the writer actually has. If so, the use of patterns
might tend to frustrate regulatory inquiry (Sect. 3.7).
4.5 Automatic Argument Generation
Some writers have proposed automatically generating safety arguments, e.g.,
from automatically constructed proofs or argument fragments associated with ar-
chitectural model elements [6,26]. Others have proposed construction assistance
that falls short of automatic generation, e.g., generating graphical argument
structures from patterns and provided parameters [38]. Automatically gener-
ated arguments might provide a sound, low-cost basis for establishing confidence
(Sect. 3.4). Moreover, arguments generated from formal proofs of requirements
refinement might illustrate that refinement more effectively than, e.g., automat-
ically constructed proofs (Sect. 3.3). But such automatic generation might not
promote safety thinking (Sect. 3.5). Moreover, automatically generated argu-
ments are likely to be less readable than bespoke arguments and thus to be less
well suited to documenting the story of a system’s safety (Sect. 3.2).
4.6 Argument Form and Notation
Safety arguments have been written in many forms, including structured and
free-form prose, tables, informal logic diagrams such as GSN, and even symbolic
logic [3,8,15,28,29,41,42,47]. Some writers draft graphical arguments to fit the di-
mensions of a printed page, while others use tools that are geared toward on-line
viewing of arguments [1]. Some guidance allows writers to omit warrants where
the connection between claims and premises is self-evident, while other writers
insist this should always be stated [15]. Formal notations might have specific
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features that facilitate automated analyses which might help to show require-
ments refinement (Sect. 3.3) or assess confidence in safety claims (Sect. 3.4). But
formal languages often require training and expertise to read and understand.
As a result, arguments written in them might be less effective at communicating
the story of a system’s safety to a broad audience (Sect. 3.2) than arguments in
informal notations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we described nine distinct schools of safety case thought identi-
fied in an ongoing literature survey. We also presented six examples of conflicts
among these schools of thought. While the schools of thought go largely uniden-
tified in the literature, tensions between them might explain disagreements, e.g.,
about the merits of formalizing or automatically generating arguments. Lack
of uniformity across the literature might also explain the difficulty in getting
started that novice safety argument writers sometimes report having [42].
There are more schools of thought than we report here, and the descriptions
we give of each are mere sketches of impressions. For example, we could have
discussed other functions of safety cases such as developers’ demonstration of due
diligence [42]. The literature survey that produced these preliminary results is
ongoing. Moreover, we are planning collaborative activities to further elaborate
the schools of thought, gauge developer and regulator interest in each of these,
and characterize potential conflicts between them.
We hope that identifying these schools of thought will contribute to both the
research and practice of safety argumentation. For example, by helping readers
to understand what writers might mean, we help them to better understand the
safety case literature. By helping researchers to better understand each other,
we might contribute to forming useful consensuses. And by establishing more
precise definitions of what it means for safety cases to ‘work,’ we might facilitate
the sort of experiments and studies whose results should define best practice.
References
1. Aiello, M.A., Hocking, A., Knight, J., Rowanhill, J.: SCT: A safety case toolkit.
In: Proc. Int’l Wksp. on Assurance Cases for SW-Intensive Systems (ASSURE).
(2014)
2. Alexander, R., Hawkins, R., Kelly, T.: Security assurance cases: Motivation and
the state of the art, issue 1.1. Tech. Rpt. CESG/TR/2011/1, University of York,
York, UK (2011)
3. Attwood, K., et al.: GSN Community Standard, Version 1. Origin Consulting
Limited (2011)
4. Ayoub, A., Kim, B., Lee, I., Sokolsky, O.: A safety case pattern for model-based
development approach. In: Proc. NASA Formal Methods. (2012)
5. Baik, M., Park, T.J., Kim, I., Jeong, J., Choi, K.: Development of a natural
analogue database to support the safety case of the Korean radioactive waste
disposal program. Swiss Journal of Geosciences 108(1) (2015)
The Safety Argumentation Schools of Thought 13
6. Basir, N., Denney, E., Fischer, B.: Deriving safety cases from automatically con-
structed proofs. In: Proc. IET Int’l Conf. on Systems Safety. (2009)
7. Birch, J., et al.: Safety cases and their role in ISO 26262 functional safety assess-
ment. In: Proc. Int’l Conf. on Computer Safety, Reliability, & Security (SafeComp).
(2013)
8. Bishop, P., Bloomfield, R.: A methodology for safety case development. In: Proc.
Safety-Critical Systems Symp. (SSS). (1998)
9. Bloomfield, R., et al.: Using Safety Cases in Industry and Healthcare. The Health
Foundation (2012)
10. Cyra, L., Gorski, J.: Supporing expert assessment of argument structures in trust
cases. In: Proc. Int’l Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conf.
(PSAM). (2008)
11. Despotou, G.: Managing the Evolution of Dependability Cases for Systems of
Systems. PhD thesis, University of York (2007)
12. Eagles, S., Wu, F.: Safety assurance cases for medical devices. Biomedical Instru-
mentation & Technology 48(1) (2014)
13. Goodenough, J., Weinstock, C., Klein, A.: Eliminative argumentation: A basis
for arguing confidence in system properties. Tech. Rpt. CMU/SEI-2015-TR-005,
Software Engineering Institute (2015)
14. Graydon, P.: Assurance Based Development. Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia
(2010)
15. Graydon, P.: Formal assurance arguments: A solution in search of a problem? In:
Proc. Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). (2015)
16. Graydon, P.: Defining Baconian Probability for use in assurance argumentation.
Tech. Memo. NASA/TM-2016-219341, NASA (2016)
17. Graydon, P., Bate, I.: Realistic safety cases for the timing of systems. The Com-
puter Journal 57(5) (2014)
18. Graydon, P., Holloway, C.M.: “Evidence” under a magnifying glass: Thoughts
on safety argument epistemology. In: Proc. IET System Safety & Cyber Security
Conf. (2015)
19. Graydon, P., Holloway, C.M.: An investigation of proposed techniques for quanti-
fying confidence in assurance arguments. Safety Science 92 (2017)
20. Graydon, P., Kelly, T.: Using argumentation to evaluate software assurance stan-
dards. Information and SW Tech. 55(9) (2013)
21. Graydon, P., Knight, J., Green, M.: Certification and safety cases. In: Proc. Int’l
Systems Safety Conf. (ISSC). (2010)
22. Greenwell, W.: Pandora: An Approach to Analyzing Safety-Related Digital-System
Failures. PhD thesis, University of Virginia (2007)
23. Haddon-Cave, C.: The Nimrod Review: An Independent Review Into The Broader
Issues Surrounding The Loss Of The RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 In
Afghanistan In 2006. The Stationery Office, London (2009)
24. Haley, C., Laney, R., Moffett, J., Nuseibeh, B.: Security requirements engineering:
A framework for representation and analysis. IEEE Trans. on SW Engineering
34(1) (2008)
25. Hawkins, R., Kelly, T.: A software safety argument pattern catalogue. Tech. Rpt.
YCS-2013-482, University of York (2013)
26. Hawkins, R., Habli, I., Kolovos, D., Paige, R., Kelly, T.: Weaving an assurance case
from design: A model-based approach. In: Proc. Int’l Symp. on High Assurance
Systems Engineering (HASE). (2015)
27. Hawkins, R., Kelly, T., Knight, J., Graydon, P.: A new approach to creating clear
safety arguments. In: Proc. Safety-Critical Systems Symp. (SSS). (2011)
14 Patrick John Graydon
28. Heavner, E., Holloway, C.M.: Assurance arguments for the non-graphically-
inclined: Two approaches. Tech. Memo. NASA/TM-2017-219650, NASA (2017)
29. Holloway, C.M.: Safety case notations: Alternatives for the non-graphically in-
clined? In: Proc. IET Int’l Conf. on System Safety (ICSS). (2008)
30. Holloway, C.M.: Explicate ’78: Uncovering the implicit assurance case in DO-178C.
In: Proc. Safety-Critical Systems Symp. (SSS). (2015)
31. ISO 26262-2:2011: Road vehicles — Functional safety — Part 2: Management of
functional safety. International Organization for Standardization (2011)
32. Kang, E., Jackson, D.: Dependability arguments with trusted bases. In: Proc. Int’l
Requirements Engineering Conf. (RE). (2010)
33. Kelly, T.: Reviewing assurance arguments: A step-by-step approach. In: Proc.
Assurance Cases for Security: The Metrics Challenge. (2007)
34. Kelly, T.: Arguing Safety — A Systematic Approach to Managing Safety Cases.
PhD thesis, University of York, York, UK (1998)
35. Knight, J., Rowanhill, J., Ferrell, U.: CLASS system certification. Tech. Rpt.
TR-2014-4, Dependable Computing LLC (2014)
36. Leveson, N., et al.: Re: [sc] safety cases. Safety Critical Mailing List thread (2012)
37. Maguire, R.: Safety Cases and Safety Case Reports: Meaning, Motivation, and
Management. Ashgate Publishing (2006)
38. Matsuno, Y., Taguchi, K.: Parameterised argument structure in GSN patterns. In:
Proc. Int’l Conference on Quality SW. (2011)
39. Moore, A., Payne, C.: The RS-232 character repeater refinement and assurance ar-
gument. Tech. Memo. NRL/MR/5540--96-7872, Naval Research Laboratory (1996)
40. NEA: The nature and purpose of the post-closure safety cases for geological repos-
itories. Tech. Rpt. NEA/RWM/R(2013)1, Nuclear Energy Agency (2013)
41. Rinehart, D., Knight, J., Rowanhill, J.: Current practices in constructing and
evaluating assurance cases with applicaitons to aviation. Contractor Rpt. CR-
2015-218678, NASA (2015)
42. Rinehart, D., Knight, J., Rowanhill, J.: Understanding what it means for assurance
cases to “work”. Contractor Rpt. NASA/CR-2017-219582, NASA (2017)
43. Rowanhill, J., Knight, J.: Domain arguments in safety critical software develop-
ment. In: Proc. Int’l Symp. on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE). (2016)
44. Rowe, J., Levitt, K., Parsons, S., Sklar, E., Applebaum, A., Jalal, S.: Argumen-
tation logic to assist in security administration. In: Proc. Wksp. on New Security
Paradigms (NSPW). (2012)
45. RTCA DO-178C: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification. RTCA, Inc. (2011)
46. Ruiz, A., Barbosa, P., Medeiros, Y., Espinoza, H.: Safety case driven development
for medical devices. In: Proc. Int’l Conf. on Computer Safety, Reliability, & Security
(SafeComp). (2015)
47. Rushby, J., Xidong, X., Murali, R., Weaver, T.: Understanding and evaluating
assurance cases. Tech. Rep. CR-2015-218802, NASA (2015)
48. Tippenhauer, N., Temple, W., Vu, A., Chen, B., Nicol, D., Kalbarczyk, Z., Sanders,
W.: Automatic generation of security argument graphs. In: Proc. IEEE Pacific
Rim Int’l Symp. on Dependable Computing (PRDC). (2014)
49. Walton, D., Reed, C., Macagno, F.: Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press (2008)
50. Zago´rski, M., Go´rski, J.: An approach for evaluating trust in IT infrastructure. In:
Proc. Int’l Conf. on Dependability of Computer Systems (DepCos-RELCOMEX).
(2006)
